This wolf is actively pupsitting - his energy regeneration is paused. This wolf has not rolled over today and will not be able to be traded or gifted until its next rollover.
Consider what it is like to have a headache
and how it feels. It is somewhat different from
what it is like to have a toothache, and vastly dif-
ferent from what it is like to taste a chocolate chip
cookie. We try to avoid headaches because of
what it is like to have them, and we try to find
and eat chocolate chip cookies, because of what it
is like to taste them.
What it is like to have a certain kind of expe-
rience is one aspect of that experience. Philoso-
phers call such aspects qualia. Other terms that
are used more or less similarly are subjective char-
acters, and phenomenal characters.
Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel in "What
Is It Like to Be a Bat?" and Frank Jackson in
"What Mary Didn't Know" claim that the qualia
or subjective characters of mental events and
states cannot be identified with or reduced to
physical aspects of those events and states. Thus
even if we suppose that headaches are brain
states, we have to admit that these brain states
have nonphysical properties, their qualia. If we
accept the arguments of Nagel and Jackson, we
seem to have to accept some form of dualism.
Minds may not be immaterial things, but at least they have immaterial properties, such as being in
states with certain conscious aspects or qualia.
David Lewis, in "Knowing What It's Like,"
claims that qualia can be handled by the physicalist.